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Abstract
We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians aﬀects the
set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate
model of representative democracy with ability diﬀerences, informative campaigning and polit-
ical parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have previously
overlooked interactions that should be studied in a uniﬁed framework. Surprisingly, increasing
the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are suﬃciently
high.
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1”Government represents about a third of our gross national product. That is a lot of our
national income to waste by discouraging the best young people from entry.”
Joseph S. Nye Jr., Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government
1 Introduction
People talk about the quality of politicians as much as the quality of their policy. This is not
surprising, because the quality of politicians profoundly aﬀects the quality of their policy.
More surprisingly, politicians’ quality is often ignored in the economic analysis, although
the quality of their policy is carefully scrutinized. By politicians’ quality we simply mean
their ability to maximize welfare by making and carrying out decisions on behalf of the rest
of society. Such skills are in scarce supply in society. Voters would like to elect competent
citizens as their representatives but, typically, these also fare well outside politics. There is
also concern that the attraction of governmental posts has been eroding. For example, the
Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2001) reports
that while in 1980 three-quarters of American graduates from his school went to work for
the government, the share has dropped in two decades to one third. This would suggest that
making a career in government attractive for the most able would call for considerable wage
increases. It has indeed often been argued - especially by politicians themselves - that the
reward for holding public oﬃce should be increased to improve the candidate quality.1 There
is, however, an elementary property of politics that may render such an action ineﬃcient at
best and detrimental at worst. Increasing the reward level may make politics more lucrative
not only to high-ability citizens but also to low-ability citizens, who also have a chance in
elections due to electoral uncertainty. The purpose of this study is to provide a stylized
1The argument has been put forward to justify the relatively high salaries and compensation of the
members of the European Parliament. It was one of the main justiﬁcations for the 35% increase in the
salaries of the members of the Finnish Parliament in 2000.
2framework to examine when the candidate quality increases with the reward level, and when
it does not.
Because the citizen-candidate models of representative democracy, pioneered by Osborne
and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), render the set of candidates endogenous,
they provide a natural framework for our study of the candidate quality. In an archetypal
citizen-candidate model any citizen may enter electoral competition at a cost, and then all
citizens elect politicians from the group of self-declared candidates. Such a simple description
of democracy involves many attractive properties, but it renders political parties redundant,
which contrasts with their prominent gategeeping role in modern elections. Often only
citizens nominated as candidates of a major party stand a realistic chance, especially in
national elections. We extend the citizen-candidate approach by adding two parties, and
assume that a party selects its candidate for the general election from the citizens who
w o u l dl i k et ob e c o m et h eo ﬃcial candidate of the party. As politics without ideological
considerations is rather implausible (Wittman 1973, 1983), we also give parties a distinct
ideology.
In our model citizens contemplating candidacy weight the expected payoﬀ from winning
an election against campaigning costs and income available outside politics. The citizens
diﬀer in their earning potential outside politics and in their competence in the oﬃce but, for
each citizen, the earning potential and competence are positively correlated. Voters would
like to have competent oﬃce holders, but the candidates have private information about
their ability. Campaigning creates a noisy signal of the ability of citizens entering politics.
To capture the inherent random factors of political life, we assume that candidates know
only their probability of emitting a good signal. As in Caillaud and Tirole (2002), parties
act as political intermediaries that reduce voters’ informational deﬁcit. The parties organize
primary elections to screen candidates so that the ability distribution of the candidates in the
3general election will be improved. The screening in the party primaries beneﬁts all citizens,
giving the parties welfare-enhancing role in increasing the quality of candidates.
Our analysis reveals that the eﬀects of the reward for oﬃce holders and campaigning
costs are not straightforward. Although our model predicts that the candidate quality is
increasing in the reward for low campaigning costs, the prediction is reversed for suﬃciently
high campaigning costs. The ﬁnding has far reaching implications. In designing the optimal
rewards for the elected oﬃcials, the campaigning costs should be given proper attention.
It may be possible to design rewards to screen the best candidates, but only when the
campaigning costs are high. When they are low, there is no way to deter low-ability citizens
from running for oﬃce.
We build on strong foundations. There is an extensive literature in which representa-
tive democracy is regarded as a principal-agent relationship where voters delegate political
power to selected candidates.2 Such delegation of decisions leads to well-known problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard problem arises, as politicians need not
act in the interest of their voters. Diﬀerent aspects of moral hazard are studied in an exten-
sive literature emerging from inﬂuential contributions by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986).
S i n c ei ti sd i ﬃcult to provide formal incentives in politics, implicit incentives in the form of
career concerns may mitigate the moral hazard problem (Holmström, 1982, and Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). Adverse selection problem results from asymmetric information concerning
the quality of candidates or platforms, as well as from the fact that voters can select politi-
cians only from those citizens who run for the oﬃce. Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ
(1990) show that when incumbent politicians have private information on their competence,
career concerns may lead to political budget cycles.3
2For excellent surveys, see Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
3More speciﬁcally, the principal-agent relationship in our model as well as in Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988)
and Rogoﬀ (1990) involves asymmetric information about the quality of the agent, whereas Holmström’s
(1982) original career concern model and its extension to politics by Persson and Tabellini (2000) invoke on
4Recent research has raised some fresh issues concerning moral hazard and adverse se-
lection problems in politics. Gersbach (2004a, 2004b) and Gersbach and Liessem (2001)
study whether the incentive contracts politicians oﬀer voters could constitute a solution to
the moral hazard problem. Besides the incentive contracts, the politicians’ opportunistic
behavior could also be constrained by the party system as argued by Caillaud and Tirole
(2002). We too view parties as delegated monitors, but we focus on the parties’ screen-
ing role in mitigating the adverse selection problem. The adverse selection problem is also
emphasized by Carrillo and Mariotti (2001), Prat (2002), Coate (2003a, 2003b) and Schultz
(2003). Carrillo and Mariotti (2001), like us, analyze the quality of candidates in a two-party
system where electoral campaign provides voters with information on candidates. They are,
however, primarily interested in the eﬀect of electoral competition on the turnover of candi-
dates. In taking the ideological dimension of politics seriously we follow Prat (2002), Coate
(2003a, 2003b) and Schultz (2003) who uncover the determinants of campaign ﬁnance and
informative advertising.
The closest papers to ours are Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2003),
and Besley (2004) who also study the candidate quality in the citizen-candidate framework
and emphasize the payoﬀ from winning an election and the opportunity cost of candidacy in
determining the quality of politicians.4 There is, however, a number of diﬀerences between
our work and theirs. For example, Caselli and Morelli (2004) assume that candidates know in
advance whether they can convince the electorate of their quality and Messner and Polborn
(2003) assume that the abilities of potential candidates are known to voters, but their
opportunity costs are private information. Besley (2004) focuses on the agency problem of
incumbents subject to a two-period limit, assuming a random selection of politicians and
the assumption of imperfect but symmetric information about the quality of the agent.
4We became aware of contributions by Besley (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2003) after having
completed our study independently.
5abstracting from campaigning costs.
In the next section we present our model. It has three key parameters: the reward for
oﬃce holders, campaigning costs, and the citizens’ ability level. The values of the parameters
specify the choice between politics and a private career. In section 3, we characterize the
political equilibria. There turns out to be a unique equilibrium set of candidates for a given
campaigning cost and a given reward. We show how the level of campaigning costs determines
w h e t h e ra ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e w a r df o ro ﬃce holders increases or decreases the candidate
quality. The political system that screens the best candidates is assessed in section 4. Ways
to pursue plausible extensions, like campaign contributions, lobbying, and corruption, are
brieﬂy discussed in the concluding section (section 5).
2T h e M o d e l
We study a two-party system with twice as many candidates as seats. Policy-makers, say
members of the parliament, must decide a polarizing issue, such as starting a war, joining the
EU, adopting Euro, nuclear power or abortion. They need also make other, less ideologically
charged, decisions on behalf of the rest of society. The representatives are selected in general
election where all citizens, including the candidates, have one vote, which is valid only if cast
for an oﬃcial candidate of a party. We focus on one district where the candidate receiving
the majority of votes in the general election is elected. In the event of a tie, the winner is
selected by a lottery.
Citizens are divided into three groups according to their ideological position. There
are 2n ideological citizens that are equally split into the two parties, which have adopted
the opposite positions in the polarizing issue. The rest of the polity consists of m non-
ideological citizens. Both the ideological party members and the non-ideological citizens can
be identiﬁed by their abilities. Citizen i’s ability is denoted by ai,a n d ,a sw ew i l le x p l a i n
6in detail below, it has a dual role in our model: both the citizen’s reservation wage outside
politics and the probability of electoral success depend on the ability. This gives the parties
an incentive to organize party primaries to screen their pool of candidates.
We consider an electoral game of three stages. The ﬁrst is the entry stage,w h e r ee a c h
citizen decides whether to stand for an election or not. In the primary stage the parties
select their candidates from the set of the citizens who express an interest in candidacy in
the ﬁrst stage. T h et h i r ds t a g ei st h egeneral election, where the citizens vote for one of the
candidates.
The decision whether to enter politics or not is based on the maximization of the expected
utility. Unsuccessful candidates and the citizens abstaining from the political campaigning
collect their reservation wages. Without loss of generality, we assume that citizen i earns
ai outside politics.5 Each candidate incurs a private campaigning cost, e, regardless of the
eventual outcome of the election. A successful candidate, an elected oﬃcial, is rewarded by
π. For the moment, we take e and π as exogenous but, in section 4, we seek the values of
e and π that maximize the candidate quality. Note that e and π need not to be monetary.
For example, campaigning may involve psychological costs such as losing privacy and being
subject to searching journalism. Being elected, on the other hand, may give ego rents as
discussed, e.g., in Rogoﬀ (1990).
Citizens have lexicographic preferences. They value most the private consumption stem-
ming from private sector wages or reward for holding an oﬃce net of campaigning cost. The
second most important term in the utility function of ideological citizens is the share of
elected candidates representing their ideology. Finally, all citizens care about the average
ability of the elected politicians. This last term in the citizens’ utility function can be moti-
vated, for example, by assuming that the higher are the representatives’ abilities, the better
5Regarding the reservation wage as c+bai,w h e r ec and b are positive constants, would not qualitatively
change the analysis.
7they can serve the interests of society in the less ideological issues.6
Voters do not know the candidates’ abilities, but campaigning creates a noisy signal
s ∈ {L,H} of the ability level where the signal can take only two values, high (H) and
low (L).A s s u m i n g t h a t ai is distributed over a unit interval we can let the probability of
candidate i emitting signal H in the general election be given by
Pr(si = H | ai)=ai. (1)
The complementary probability, i.e., the probability that candidate i signals L,i st h e n
Pr(si = L | ai)=1− ai. (2)
Also party primaries produce a signal of candidates’ abilities. The probability that a
primary election candidate i emits a signal H is given by:
Pr(s
p




where the presence of δ,δ > 0, captures the stylized fact that screening of politicians tends
to be more accurate in general elections. Therefore, even citizens with a =0have a positive
probability of emitting signal H in party primaries.





6We view lexicographic preferences as a reasonable simpliﬁcation especially for politicians in parliamentary
elections, as the outcome in a single district is rarely decisive. In the absence of lexicographic preferences,
some politicians would abstain from party primaries even with a positive expected private return, simply
to give their fellow party members with higher ability a chance to run in the general election. Given
the lexicographic preferences we can also derive as a special case a simpliﬁed version of the model without
ideological consideration and with random candidate selection within the parties, (see Poutvaara and Takalo,
2003).








Figure 1: Electoral Game




0 g(a)da =1 .F o raﬁnite δ, (4) suggests that higher ability
levels are less likely. Moreover, together with the signalling technology of the party primaries
(3), (4) implies that the ability of the citizens who signal H in the party primary will be
uniformly distributed, allowing for an analytic solution of the model.7 As will be explained
in section 2.2., this means that the party primaries provide an additional screening stage
that improves the average quality of candidates.
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si ss u m m a r i z e di nF i g u r e1 .
We construct political equilibria of the model by using the concept of a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Such equilibria consist of three components: 1) Citizens’ candidacy strategies,
i.e., decisions whether to enter primary elections. Let Ii ∈ {0,1} denote citizen i’s entry
decision where Ii =1if the citizen enters the primaries and Ii =0if he or she does not.
2) Citizens’ voting behavior describes how the citizens vote as a function of the information
they have received in the campaign. To reduce the number of equilibria, we assume that
7With diﬀerent distributional assumptions, the model could be solved numerically.
9all vote, and that they vote as if they were pivotal. This implies that all ideological voters
vote for their party’s candidate in the general election, and all non-ideological voters prefer
the candidate with higher expected ability, randomizing their vote if indiﬀerent. 3) Voters’
belief function describes a common assessment that candidate i is of higher expected ability
than candidate j conditional on the variables that voters observe. In other words, given Ii,
Ij, si,a n dsj, voters can share one of three alternative beliefs. We denote the belief that
E(ai) >E (aj) by 1, the belief that E(ai) <E (aj) by −1, and the belief that E(ai)=E(aj)
by 0.L e tµ(Ii,I j,s i,s j) ∈ {1,−1,0} denote the voters’ belief given the candidates’ entry
decisions and the signals they have emitted. As shown in the Appendix, Bayes’ rule implies
that µ(1,1,H,L)=1 , µ(1,1,L,H)=−1, µ(1,1,H,H)=0 ,a n dµ(1,1,L,L)=0 .
2.1 General Election
Given the belief µ and our assumptions on voting behavior, a candidate signalling H wins
the general election with a probability of one, when the opponent signals L. Each candidate
has n secured voters, m voters being mobile. If both candidates send the same signal, each
candidate wins with a probability of one-half. In sum, if candidates i and j run for an oﬃce
as oﬃcial candidates, candidate i wins with a probability of p(w | ai,a j),w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
p(w | ai,a j)=P r ( si = H | ai)Pr(sj = L | aj)+
1
2 [Pr(si = H | ai)Pr(sj = H | aj)+P r ( si = L | ai)Pr(sj = L | aj)].
(5)
Substituting (1) and (2) for (5) and simplifying, (5) can be expressed as:




10Equation (6) captures the inherent uncertainty of democratic elections. While the probability
of being elected is increasing in candidate’s relative ability, the better candidate cannot be
certain of winning the election.
2.2 Primary Stage
The oﬃcial candidates are nominated by the parties, who select their candidates in party
primaries. All party members can present themselves as potential candidates in their party’s
primary. If none of the party members present themselves in party primary, the party opens
its primary to non-ideological citizens.8 As a result, there is a set of primary election can-
didates C(e,π) who have committed to campaigning if nominated as the oﬃcial candidate
of a party. The members of the party prefer candidates who send a high signal in primary
election, because such candidates have both a better chance of winning the general election
and higher expected competence to serve society in non-ideological issues. If several candi-
dates signal H in the primary, the oﬃcial candidate is randomly selected among them. If
none of the candidates signals H in the primary and there are several potential candidates,
the primary election process is repeated so that new signals are drawn until at least one H-
signal is obtained. When δ>0, this occurs with probability one when the signal extraction
is repeated suﬃciently many rounds. 9
By (3) and (4), the ability distribution of candidates emerging from the primaries is uni-
form on the interval that is determined by the start and end points of the ability distribution
of primary election candidates, which has more mass on the lower end of the interval. The
ability distribution of the candidates in the general election thus ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates the ability distribution of the primary election candidates. This screening in the
8We assume that there are at least two non-ideological citizens of ability zero. This technical assumption
prevents in some cases the collapse of democracy merely because of the randomness of ability realization.
9To rule out the use of repeated primaries as yet another screening device, we assume that once a candidate
has signalled H in primary, the signal persists until the launch of general election campaign.
11party primaries also beneﬁts non-ideological citizens, giving the parties welfare-enhancing
role in improving the quality of candidates.
We now proceed to the ﬁrst stage where the citizens choose whether they pursue a career
in politics or remain ordinary citizens.
2.3 Entry Stage
Note that (6) measures the winning probability after both parties have nominated the candi-
dates. When a citizen contemplates candidacy the winning probability should be calculated
before the parties select their candidates. Formally, if citizen i decides to run for oﬃce, the




p(w | ai,x)f(x)dx,( 7 )
where f(x) is the density function of the abilities of the potential candidates who signal
H in primary elections. As explained, this ability distribution is uniform by (3) and (4).
We therefore proceed under the assumption that the candidates’ abilities are uniformly
distributed between a and a, which denote the lowest and highest ability of the potential
opponent with 0 ≤ a ≤ a ≤ 1. The ability thresholds a and a are determined as part of the
equilibrium, but each citizen takes them as given when deciding whether to run for oﬃce
or not. We denote the set of those abilities from which candidates are selected by C(e,π)
=[ a,a].
By using the uniformity of the distribution of those who actually become candidates and






(1 + ai − x)dx. (8)







2 denotes the average quality of potential candidates. Given the campaigning
cost, e, the reward for oﬃce holders, π, the reservation wage, ai, the belief, µ,a n dt h ev o t i n g
behavior, citizen i decides to run for oﬃce only if:
P(w | ai)π +( 1− P(w | ai))ai − e ≥ ai,( 1 0 )
where the left-hand side and the right-hand side capture the expected payoﬀ of running for
oﬃce and the outside option. Inserting (9) into (10) and simplifying yields:
1
2
(1 + ai − A)(π − ai) − e ≥ 0.( 1 1 )
Equation (11) holds as an equality for the pivotal citizens who are indiﬀerent between a
public and private career. Letting (11) be an equality and rearranging gives the condition
−a
2
i + ai (π + A − 1) + π(1 − A) − 2e =0 .( 1 2 )
As the left-hand side of (12) is a downward-opening parable, the values of a satisfying (11)
are between the values that solve (12). Thus, if a solution exists, it satisﬁes our hypothesis
that all citizens between a and a are interested in candidacy. However, the solutions of (12)
need not to be on the open unit interval. Upon solving (12) for ai, we can write the ability
level of the pivotal citizens as:
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3 Findings
3.1 Political Equilibria
In this section, we determine political equilibria corresponding all non-negative values of the
reward for oﬃce holders and campaigning costs. We restrict our attention to the range of
parameter values where e ≤ 1
2 and divide parameter space {0 ≤ e ≤ 1
2;π ≥ 0} into diﬀerent
regions according to what is the ability range from which citizen-candidates enter politics.
I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h ee q u i l i b r i aw es p e c i f ya r eu n i q u ef o re a c hc o m b i n a t i o n(e,π).O n et y p e
of equilibria is a pooling equilibrium where the set of those willing to become candidates
C(e,π)=[ 0 ,1].W e c a l li tuniversal democracy. Then there are potentially three types of
semiseparating equilibria, mediocre candidates when C(e,π)=[ a,a] with 0 <a≤ a<1,
competent candidates when C(e,π)=[ a,1] with a > 0,a n dincompetent candidates when
C(e,π)=[ 0 ,a] with a<1. Finally, we take that there is a collapse of democracy when
t h ep a r t i e sc a n n o tb ec e r t a i nt h a tt h e ya r ea b l et on o m i n a t eac a n d i d a t e . F o r t u n a t e l y ,i t
turns out that various political equilibria can be characterized by dividing the campaigning
costs into two ranges. We say that campaigning costs are relatively high when e ≥ b e ≡ 3
8.
Accordingly, they are called relatively low when e<b e.10
Using the aforementioned terminology we will ﬁrst present six Lemmas characterizing
the political equilibria. The proofs of Lemmas are relegated to the Appendix. We then
invoke on the Lemmas to derive the two main results concerning the impact of π and e on
the candidate quality. We ﬁrst prove:
10We report results allowing for e>1
2 in an earlier version (Poutvaara and Takalo, 2003).
14Lemma 1 There is no mixed strategy equilibrium where a positive mass of citizens would be
indiﬀerent between standing for an election and staying outside politics.
Because Lemma 1 means that examining mixed strategy equilibria is inconsequential, in
what follows, we focus on equilibria in which citizen-candidates play pure strategies, i.e.,
they either stand for an election or stay outside politics.
Lemma 2 Universal democracy exists when campaigning costs are high and π ≥ 4e or when
campaigning costs are low and π ≥ 1+4
3e.
Lemma 2 simply says that when the reward for oﬃce holders is suﬃciently high relative
to the costs of campaigning, everyone is willing to gamble and become a candidate.
Lemma 3 Candidates are mediocre when campaigning costs are high and
π ∈ (1 +
√
1 − 2e,2 −
√
1 − 2e).
Lemma 3 reveals that in an intermediate range of the reward for oﬃce holders and high
campaigning costs, both citizens with highest and those with lowest ability ﬁnd politics
unattractive. With low campaigning costs, there is no such range of rewards that this would
be the case.
Lemma 4 Candidates are competent when campaigning costs are high and π ∈ [2−
√
1 − 2e,4e).
There are two requirements for the high expected competence of elected politicians. The
campaigning costs should be suﬃciently high and the reward for oﬃce holders suﬃciently
low to deter low competence citizens from politics. The reward for oﬃce holders, however,
should not be too low so that it dilutes the high ability citizens’ incentives to engage in
politics.







or when campaigning costs are low and π ∈ [2e,1+4
3e).
Lemma 5 gives a warning that the expected quality of politicians may be low when the
campaigning is cheap. In such a case, especially the low-ability citizens are willing to take
t h eg a m b l ea n dr u nf o ro ﬃce. Expected quality of politicians may be low also with high
campaigning costs, in case the reward is set in a low level.
There are also equilibria without a properly working democracy. We take that democracy
collapses if there is no political equilibrium where both parties are certain to nominate a
candidate.
Lemma 6 i) If π<e , neither party is able to nominate a candidate. ii) If π ∈ [e,2e),t h e r e
is no equilibrium where both parties nominate a candidate with probability one.
The explanation why democracy can collapse is straightforward. If the reward from
winning an election is smaller than campaigning costs, citizens do not enter politics even if
they were certain to win the election. If the reward is low but slightly above the campaigning
costs, citizens may stand for an election if they are rather certain of winning it. But if both
parties could nominate a candidate, the probability of winning cannot exceed one half for
both candidates. This unravels all the symmetric equilibria where both parties nominate a
candidate.
We capture the consequences of Lemmas 1-6 in Proposition 1 and Figure 2.
Proposition 1 i) When campaigning costs are low, there is universal democracy for π ≥
1+4
3e and candidates are incompetent for π ∈ [2e,1+4
3e).
ii) When campaigning costs are high, there is universal democracy for π ≥ 4e, candidates
are competent for π ∈ [2 −
√









, and candidates are incompetent for π ∈ [2e,1+
√
1 − 2e].
16iii) If π<2e, there is no equilibrium where both parties nominate a candidate with a
probability one.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 1-6.
As one would expect, when the payoﬀ from winning an election is suﬃciently high, every-
one is willing to gamble and run for oﬃce. Analogously, when the payoﬀ is suﬃciently low,
no one is willing to sacriﬁce the campaigning costs to become a candidate. The ﬁndings
are somewhat more surprising when they are evaluated against the common view (and the
ﬁndings in Caselli and Morelli, 2004) that increasing the reward for oﬃce holders or decreas-
ing the campaigning costs increases the candidate quality. Proposition 1 suggests that the
range of parameters where the common view holds is rather restricted.W h e ns t a r t i n gi nt h e
region with competent candidates, increasing the reward or reducing the campaigning cost
may result in a decrease in the average quality of candidates, by encouraging also low-ability
citizens to run. When campaigning is costly, the low ability citizens are reluctant to run for
the oﬃce, since their prospects to be elected are low. Thus, decreasing the expected returns
on campaigning eﬀectively excludes the low-ability citizens from the set of candidates. In
contrast, when campaigning is cheap, there is no way to screen the best candidates, because
the low ability citizens are eager to run for oﬃce even when the payoﬀ from winning is low.
Note that our ﬁndings do not hinge on the multiplicity of equilibria.
Proposition 2 Provided that democracy does not collapse, there is a unique symmetric
political equilibrium for a given campaigning cost and a given reward.
Proof. It directly follows from Lemmas 1-6 and Proposition 1 that there is no range
of parameter values where two or more types of equilibria overlap, if democracy does not
collapse, i.e., if π ≥ 2e.
The messages of Propositions 1 and 2 can be illustrated in the (e,π)-space (Figure 2).
Let us ﬁrst consider the region of low campaigning costs (e<b e). The region is split by two
17lines, π =2 e and π =1 +4
3e. Below the lower line (π =2 e), there is no democracy (N) in the
sense that one or both of parties fail to nominate a candidate. Between the lines, candidates





, there is universal democracy (U).
Figure 2 also shows the role of campaigning costs. If we exclude them, we will stay on the
vertical axis e =0of Figure 2. In that case, increasing the pay of politicians would increase
candidate quality until universal democracy is reached.11 As can be seen from Figure 2, such
a result does not carry over to high values of campaigning costs.







is divided into ﬁve subareas by two
lines, π =2 e and π =4 e, and two curves, π =2−
√
1 − 2e and π =1+
√
1 − 2e.A s i n
the case of low campaigning costs, below the lower line (π =2 e), democracy collapses and,














and the upper line (π =4 e), candidates are competent. Finally,
between the curves the candidates are mediocre (M).
In assessing the reliability of observations here, a caveat should be kept in mind. Models
with private information raise the question of how robust are ﬁndings with respect to the
parameter that is private information. Fortunately, this is not an issue here. On the one
hand, our ﬁndings are broadly speaking similar to the ones in Messner and Polborn (2003)
where the reward from oﬃce, (π −e), is private information and vary across candidates. On
the other hand, letting campaigning costs be private information and vary across candidates
would certainly change the ﬁndings, but the problem would then be rather uninteresting,
since the voters care only about candidates’ ability, not their campaigning costs. Such an
assumption might be more fruitful in analyzing private provision of a public good in a small
group like a university department or a school district, and could result in wars of attrition









Figure 2: Political Equilibria
as suggested by Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996). Our model
predicts that the wars of attrition may emerge in the region of the collapse of democracy,
but for a wide range of parameter values becoming a politician is attractive at least for
some citizens. Because in almost all elections in large jurisdictions there is more than one
candidate, politicians at least in major elections seem to be pleased to be elected rather than
reluctantly concede to run.
3.2 Interpretation
As illustrated by Figure 2, political equilibria are complex but unique. The condition for
citizen i to enter politics, (10), can be rewritten as
(π − ai) · P(w | ai) ≥ e. (15)
19The left-hand side of (15) presents the expected increase in income created by candidacy.
It is the product of the net return from winning election, π − ai, and the probability of
winning, P(w | ai). The right-hand side is the campaigning cost, e,p a i dw i t hc e r t a i n t y .
Equation (15) shows that politics is attractive if the expected increase in income exceeds
campaigning costs, and that a change in either π or e h a sb o t had i r e c ta n da ni n d i r e c te ﬀect
on the attractiveness of politics. Keeping P(w | ai) constant, the direct eﬀect of an increase
in π or a decrease in e encourages the entry to politics for all ability levels. To arrive at full
behavioral responses, we also have to take into account the induced changes in P(w | ai).
If the direct eﬀect improves the average quality of candidates, there will be a reduction in
P(w | ai). This indirect eﬀect then discourages the entry to politics. Whether there is
ultimately an improvement in the candidate quality depends on the relative magnitude of
the direct and indirect eﬀects. For example, consider the shift from the area I to area M in
Figure 2. The direct eﬀect of an increase in π renders politics lucrative for some high ability
citizens. Because new high ability citizens become candidates, P(w | 0) decreases. When
campaigning costs are moderate, the indirect eﬀect can dominate over the direct eﬀect for
low-ability citizens. As a result, the citizens of the lowest abilities leave politics and the
average candidate quality improves.
To illustrate the direct and indirect eﬀects, we present in Figure 3 a and a as a function
of π, ﬁxing e = 4
9.T h e b e h a v i o r o f a is easy to explain: The direct eﬀect of increasing
π always dominates for high-ability types, so that increasingly higher ability citizens ﬁnd
politics attractive when the reward for elected politicians rises. The behavior of low-ability
citizens is more complicated. Initially an increase in the reward in a case of being elected
more than oﬀsets the decrease in the probability of winning caused by the entry of the
high-ability citizens, and all low-ability citizens want to become candidates. However, when
4
3 ≤ π<5











Figure 3: Set of Candidates (e=4/9)
indirect eﬀect of the decreased P(w | ai) dominates over the direct eﬀect of the increased
π − a.O n c e π = 5
3 is reached, all high-ability citizens already are candidates. Then a
further increase in π no longer dilutes the low-ability citizens’ prospects of being elected,
thus stimulating them again to participate in politics. Once π ≥ 16
9 is reached, universal
democracy prevails. As a result, candidates are incompetent when 8




3, and competent when 5
3 ≤ π<16
9 . The average quality of candidates ﬁrst
increases from zero until it reaches 2
3 at π = 5




4 Screening the Best Candidates
In the previous section the set of candidates was determined by the model, but the reward
for oﬃce holders and campaigning costs remained exogenous. This then raises the question
of where they come from. Although a thorough exploration on the issue is beyond the scope
21of this study, we here brieﬂy assess whether it is possible to design rewards and campaigning
costs to screen only the citizens with the highest ability (a =1 )to run. Proposition 1
suggests that such a political system is impossible when campaigning is cheap. Neither is
it possible to screen the best candidates when campaigning costs are high, as the following
proposition veriﬁes.
Proposition 3 With low campaigning costs, maximum quality of candidates arises with
universal democracy. With high campaigning costs, maximum quality of candidates arises
when π =2−
√
1 − 2e. There is no combination of e and π that only the citizens with a =1
w o u l dw a n tt ob e c o m ep o l i t i c i a n s .
Proof. With low campaigning costs, the set of citizens is, if democracy does not collapse,
[0,a]. The average quality is increasing in a, reaching maximum with universal democracy.
With high campaigning costs, ﬁr s tn o t ef r o m( A 7 )t h a ta is decreasing in π.T o g e t h e rw i t h
Lemma 4 this means that the maximum candidate quality occurs for high campaigning costs
when π =2−
√
1 − 2e. Substituting π =2−
√
1 − 2e for (A7) shows that a < 1
2.
Proposition 3 establishes that even by regulating both campaigning costs and the payoﬀ
from winning an election, it is not possible to induce only the highest-ability citizens to run
for oﬃce. Nonetheless, the ability distribution of candidates can be improved by a suitable
choice of e and π. Numerically, we can solve that the maximum ability of candidates arises
when e =0 .445 and π =1 .668, resulting in a =0 .332 and average ability 0.666.
Note that the ﬁndings here do not suggest that it would necessarily be socially desirable to
attract the highest-ability citizens to politics. In our model the ability in politics is perfectly
correlated with the earning potential in the private sector. The higher the ability of the
elected oﬃcial, the larger is the loss to the private sector. Thus, only if the marginal social
beneﬁt of talent in politics exceeds the social loss of it not being employed in the private
sector, the most talented citizens should be politicians. Using the scope of an electoral
22district as a proxy for social beneﬁts from good politics, it seems that the expected quality
of politicians should be maximum in national and state-level tasks. In contrast, it may
be socially too costly to attract the most talented citizens to politics in small towns and
school districts. This may be a reason why the reward typically rises with the scope of
an electoral district. In the United States, for example, annual pay for state legislators
ranges from $99,000 plus per diem in California to mere $200 for two-year term in New
Hampshire without per diem (Book of States 2000/2001). Proper evaluation of the relative
social beneﬁts from politics and private sector activities would, however, require a general
equilibrium environment and is left for future research.
5 Conclusion and Further Research
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of campaigning costs and the reward for oﬃce holders on the can-
didate quality are surprisingly complicated. Depending the level of campaigning costs, an
increase in the reward for oﬃce holders may increase or decrease the candidate quality. If the
costs are high, it may be optimal to decrease the reward to screen the best candidates. When
campaigning is cheap, there is no way to screen the best candidates, because the low-ability
citizens have a comparative advantage in politics. The ﬁndings suggest that it is possible
to design a political system so that the average ability of candidates exceeds that among all
citizens. But even the most eﬃcient system is far from providing perfect screening of only
citizens with highest quality to enter politics.
Our model also indicates that corruption and lobbying can have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
politicians’ quality, depending on whether they primarily increase the reward for elected
oﬃce holders or lower the campaigning costs of candidates. If campaigning costs are high,
bribes to elected politicians can paradoxically deter low-ability citizens from running, mov-
ing political equilibrium from incompetent candidates to mediocre or even to competent
23candidates (see Figure 2). If candidates are initially competent, however, the bribes can
trigger the entry of low-ability citizens to politics, diminishing the average candidate qual-
ity. This may help to explain why bribery is generally condemned in developed countries
with high levels of campaigning costs and rewards, while being often tolerated in develop-
ing countries. In a developing country where neither campaigning costs nor oﬃcial rewards
are high, bribery can help to attract citizens with higher skills to enter politics, perhaps at
the cost of attracting also citizens with questionable ethics. In a variety of circumstances,
campaign contributions can reduce the candidate quality. If campaigning costs are to large
extent covered by special interest groups, they will no longer deter low-ability citizens from
entering politics. Nonetheless, a thorough analysis of corruption and lobbying would require
their careful modelling along the lines of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Besley and
Coate (2001).
Our simple and tractable model invites a number of extensions. Because uncovering the
crucial role of campaigning costs in determining the quality of politicians is one of our key
contributions, future r e s e a r c hs h o u l di nt u r nd e v o t em o r ea t t e n t i o nt ot h ed e t e r m i n a n t so f
campaigning costs. For example, one could assume that the level of campaigning costs is a
choice variable and that the probability of a high signal conditional on the ability level is
increasing in campaigning costs. Catering to special interest groups in exchange for campaign
contributions can also generate an entry barrier to independent candidates or third parties
in a similar manner as a polarized ideological issue or screening through the primaries of
established parties. Studying campaign contributions and informative advertising is clearly
an area that deserves further research. Combining our framework with the advances by
Prat (2002), Coate (2003a, 2003b) and Schultz (2003) could turn out to be fruitful in this
task. Further insights into equilibrium political structure could be obtained by incorporating
some features from Poutvaara (2003) into our model. In his model potential party activists
24decide whether to join a party based on previous party platforms. Party platforms for the
subsequent election are then chosen by median party members. Even with the given party
platforms, there is uncertainty of electoral outcome. Assuming that such uncertainty arises
from electoral campaigning and diﬀerences in candidates’ abilities as in this paper, one could
let party members choose a candidate with a given ideological preference and an unknown
ability. Electoral landscape would then be jointly determined by campaigning costs, political
rewards, and ideological distribution of party activists and voters.
Following the citizen-candidate approach developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and
Besley and Coate (1997), we have viewed politics as a career choice, motivated by private re-
turns from holding oﬃce. However, neither the reward for oﬃc eh o l d e r sn o rt h ec a m p a i g n i n g
costs in our model are necessarily monetary. For example, the reward may include ideological
concerns and psychological satisfaction from holding oﬃce that may be driven by ”selﬁsh”
concerns of receiving fame and public recognition. The campaigning costs may also include
psychological eﬀects stemming, e.g., from searching journalism and negative campaigning.12
Therefore, our model suggests that both ideological competition between parties and jour-
nalistic practices aﬀect the set of citizens willing to become politicians. Consensus politics
together with dull press keep the ideological rewards for oﬃce holders and campaigning costs
low and, consequently, the high-ability citizens outside politics. Low quality of politicians
f r o me s t a b l i s h e dp a r t i e sm a yi nt u r nl e a v et h ed o o ro p e nf o rp o p u l i s tm o v e m e n t s .T h i sl e a d s
t oab o l di n t e r p r e t a t i o no fo u rﬁndings: maintaining ideological tension between mainstream
parties and providing an appropriate monetary reward for elected politicians together with
a vigilant press may be used to attract high-ability candidates from established parties and
preempt entry by populist movements.
12Such psychological costs can be even more eﬀective than pure monetary costs if the rewards are also
mainly psychological and if citizens diﬀer in their private wealth. With diminishing marginal utility of
private consumption, politics associated with predominantly monetary campaigning costs would not deter
rich citizens with low abilities, but might deter poor citizens with high abilities.
25Appendix.
Voters’ beliefs
In this appendix we derive voters’ belief from citizens’ candidacy strategies. Let f(a)
denote the subjective density function that voters attach to a candidate being of ability a
before a signal is received, and let a and a be the lowest and the highest expected ability
of a candidate. Furthermore, we assume that citizens rationally anticipate that f(a)= 1
a−a,
as this turns out to be the case in equilibrium. The expected ability of a randomly selected
candidate before a signal is revealed is E(a)=
R a
a (f(a) · a)da =
a+a
2 . The expected ability
subject to signal H is, by Bayes’ rule,
E(ai | H)=
R a
a f(a) · a · Pr(si = H | a)da
Pr(s = H)
.











2(a2 + aa + a2)
3(a + a)
.
Correspondingly, the expected ability of candidate j signalling L is
E(aj | L)=
R a
a f(a) · a · Pr(sj = L | a)da
Pr(s = L)
.




3a +3 a − 2a2 − 2a2 − 2aa
6 − 3a − 3a
.
The candidate with a high signal is of higher expected quality, if E(ai | H) >E (aj | L).I f
a>a ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o3(a−a)2 > 0. Therefore, we have established that when a>a ,t h e
26candidate signaling H has a higher expected ability than the candidate signaling L.B e c a u s e
a signal about a citizen’s ability is emitted only if the citizen decides to enter primary
elections and is selected as the oﬃcial candidate of a party, voters’ belief µ(Ii,I j,s i,s j)
∈ {1,−1,0} when a>acan be described as follows: µ(1,1,H,L)=1 , µ(1,1,L,H)= −1,
µ(1,1,H,H)=0 ,a n dµ(1,1,L,L)=0 . If all candidates are of the same ability (a = a), the
signals in principle will lose their informativeness, and we can not use Bayes’ rule to calculate
the voters’ belief. Because this case is quite immaterial with continuous ability distribution
we, for simplicity, assume that when a = a, µ(Ii,I j,s i,s j) remains unchanged ∀si,s j.S u c h
equilibrium where voters pay attention to signals even if a = a would also probably be the
only one included in the set of trembling-hand perfect or sequential equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 1. For citizens willing to run with a probability strictly between
zero and one, the left-hand side of (11) would have to equal zero. Otherwise, citizens would
ﬁnd it optimal to play a pure strategy of running with a probability of either zero or one.
Diﬀerentiating the left-hand side of (11) with respect to a yields 1
2(π + A − 1) − ai.T h i si s
positive (negative) when 1
2(π +A−1) > (<)ai. Thus, the left-hand side of (11) is zero in at
most two points in the interval [0,1] and, consequently, the measure of citizens indiﬀerent
between running and staying outside politics is zero.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . When all citizens are potential candidates, the average ability of
potential candidates A equals 1
2. After substituting A = 1
2 f o r( 1 3 )w es e et h a tt h ec i t i z e n
with the lowest ability (a =0 ) is willing to become a candidate if, and only if,
π ≥ 4e. (A1)
Similarly, substituting A = 1
2 for (14) and simplifying shows that the citizen with the highest




e.( A 2 )
Equations (A1) and (A2) suggest that all citizens are candidates if π ≥ max(4e,1+4
3e).T h e
proof is completed by noting that the condition 4e T 1+4
3e is equivalent to the condition
e T b e.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . When the citizens with an intermediate ability seek candidacy,
the solutions of (12) give the candidates with the highest and lowest ability. From (13) and
(14) we then get that A =
a+a
2 is equivalent to A = π+A−1
2 . As a result, the average quality
of potential candidates reads as
A = π − 1.( A 3 )
Substituting (A3) for (13) and (14) gives the threshold levels for the candidates’ abilities
a = π − 1 −
√
1 − 2e (A4)
and
a = π − 1+
√
1 − 2e.( A 5 )
Note that the terms under square roots are always non-negative as e ≤ 1
2.E q u a t i o n ( A 4 )
shows that a > 0 only if π>1+
√
1 − 2e and (A5) shows that a<1 only if π<2−
√
1 − 2e.
On the other hand, 2 −
√
1 − 2e ≥ 1+
√
1 − 2e only if e ≥ b e. The equilibrium where
the citizens with an intermediate ability become candidates thus exists only if π ∈ (1 +
√
1 − 2e,2 −
√






Proof of Lemma 4. When the citizens with the lowest ability choose a career in the
private sector, the average quality of the candidates is A =
1+a
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π − 1 −
p
(π +1 ) 2 − 16e
i
, (A7)
is greater than zero only if π<4e. The larger root can be excluded, as it would be positive
also when π ≥ 4e. That would violate the condition that the citizen with a =0is unwilling
to be a candidate. By using (A7), we see that the average quality of the potential candidates
A =
1+a







(π +1 ) 2 − 16e
i
. (A8)
We next conﬁrm that the citizen with the highest ability is willing to be a candidate, i.e.,










Upon some manipulation, (A9) can be simpliﬁed to
(2 − A)(π − 1) − 2e ≥ 0. (A10)
29After substituting (A8) for (A10) and some laborious algebra, the condition can be re-
expressed as
(π − 1)
2(π − 3) − 2e(π − 1)(π − 4) − 4e
2 ≥ 0. (A11)
We can now characterize the equilibria where only the most competent citizens
present themselves as candidates. Although (A11) is highly non-linear in π,i ti se a s yt o
show that it holds only if π ≥ 2+
√




1 − 2e,2e +1
¤




1 − 2e ≥ 2e +1≥ 4e. Because, by (A7), a > 0 only if π<4e, the relevant parameter
range is π ∈ [2−
√
1 − 2e,4e) which is a non-empty set only if e>b e. In sum, the equilibrium





when π ∈ [2 −
√
1 − 2e,4e).
Proof of Lemma 5. When the citizens with the highest abilities choose a career in
private sector, the average quality of the potential candidates is A = a
2. Assuming that a<1
and substituting a










.( A 1 2 )
Since the smaller root of (A12) is strictly less than (14), we observe that only the larger root











satisﬁes our assumption that it is less than unity only if π<1+4
3e.W en e x tc o n ﬁrm that
the citizen with the lowest ability is also willing to be a candidate, i.e., that a =0 .F r o m
(14) we see that this holds if




30After some algebra, this can be expressed as
π(1 − A) ≥ 2e. (A14)
A necessary condition is thus that π ≥ 2e. Substituting A = a
2 and (A13) into (A14), and
simplifying yields, after tedious algebra,
(π − 2e)(π
2 − 2π +2 e) ≤ 0. (A15)








, which is non-empty with
all e ≤ 1
2.B e c a u s e2e ≥ 1 −
√







. Because, by (A13), a<1 only if π<1+4
3e, we need to check out
when
√
1 − 2e ≤ 4
3e. This occurs when e ≥ b e. Thus, the equilibrium where C(e,π)=[ 0 ,a]











,a n df o re ≤ b e when π ∈ [2e,1+4
3e).
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . i) If π<e , no citizen is willing to campaign even if being
assured of winning. ii) Let us make the counter-assumption that both parties are able to
nominate a candidate in the region π ∈ [e,2e) with probability one. Because π<2e,t h e
expected payoﬀ from candidacy cannot be positive, even without opportunity costs, unless
the expected probability of winning the general election is more than 1
2. This cannot hold
for candidates of both parties.
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